

# ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

AMB. MERCHANT TESTIMONY.

HEARING

HOLD FOR RELEASE

BEFORE THE

MON APR 6 1964 AM

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 27, 1964

PART 7

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

30-282

WASHINGTON : 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, *Chairman*

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington	KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina	CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska	JACK MILLER, Iowa
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine	JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island	
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire	
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut	
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland	

WALTER L. REYNOLDS, *Chief Clerk and Staff Director*

ARTHUR A. SHARP, *Staff Editor*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, *Chairman*

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine	JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island	JACK MILLER, Iowa
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut	
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland	

DOROTHY FOSDICK, *Staff Director*

ROBERT W. TUFTS, *Chief Consultant*

RICHARD S. PAGE, *Research Assistant*

JUDITH J. SPAHR, *Chief Clerk*

LAUREL A. ENGBERG, *Minority Consultant*

## CONTENTS

---

FEBRUARY 27, 1964

	Page
Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson.....	445
Testimony of the Honorable Livingston T. Merchant.....	446
Memorandum of the Honorable Edmund A. Gullion on "The American Diplomatist in Developing Countries" (with introductory note by Senator Henry M. Jackson).....	471

III

## ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1964

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

[This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.]

The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, Brewster, Javits, and Miller.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the subcommittee will take additional testimony on the role of American ambassadors and the relation of Washington to our diplomatic missions in the field. This subject has been a central one in our nonpartisan study of the administration of national security.

Our witness today is the Honorable Livingston T. Merchant, career ambassador, retired, who has had a long, varied, and successful experience in high posts in Washington and overseas. Today he is back on duty as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for NATO Multilateral Force Negotiations.

A Princeton graduate, Ambassador Merchant was associated with Scudder, Stevens & Clark, investment counsel firm, from 1926 to 1942, for 12 years as partner. His period of public service dates from 1942 when he joined the Department of State.

Ambassador Merchant's posts have included Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1953-56; Ambassador to Canada, 1956-58; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1958-59; Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1959-61; and Ambassador to Canada, 1961-62.

I might observe that I think you have set somewhat of a record, Mr. Ambassador, in that you became a career ambassador after about 20 years of Federal service including service within the Department of State. I don't know of any other person who has been so honored and who has come up so fast and who has done such an outstanding job in that time.

I might venture the guess that maybe your fine experience as an investment banker has been of some help. We have noted with great interest over the years that people with investment banking experience are so often outstanding in the field of national security. The list of those people is very impressive.

We are very fortunate to have you with us, and you may wish to start out with some informal remarks before we ask you questions.

**STATEMENT OF HON. LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT, CAREER  
AMBASSADOR, RETIRED**

Ambassador MERCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no prepared statement. I am delighted to be here. I have followed, of course, the work of this subcommittee with the greatest interest. I think I have read all of the reports that have been issued. I have only recently refamiliarized myself with two for this appearance, "The Secretary of State" and "Basic Issues" on the role of the ambassador.

I think the work being done is tremendously constructive. Everyone I know who is interested in these problems of operating successfully in the field of national security is equally impressed.

I have a few opinions and convictions on certain aspects of the phase of Government operations that I have been concerned with. Probably rather than get into them in a disconnected fashion, it might be better to let questions and answers develop discussion. If I find any point I really feel strongly about that hasn't been touched on, I will volunteer it.

Senator JACKSON. Why don't we start out this way: In your judgment, how big is the job of Ambassador today? This is a period of fast travel and quick communication and decisions have to be made on short notice. This obviously affects the job of any Ambassador.

Many of these great changes have occurred during your period of service. Would you tell us in your judgment how important is the job of Ambassador today, and what are some of the problems as you see them?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well, I think the character of the role has greatly changed over the years. To me the role of the Ambassador is, or certainly can be, just as important as it ever was.

If you go back 150 years, the Presidential envoy to a foreign country would be 6 or 8 weeks out of communication with his Government and it was impossible to obtain prompt instructions, or amendments to his instructions. He necessarily operated as a negotiator, a representative, with a very considerable field for personal maneuver and decision.

Instant communication has obviously changed that. The complexity of the world has changed it. I think increasingly today the importance of the Ambassador really depends on the man himself. It is often overlooked, for example, that in bilateral dealings with any country, each government or each of the two governments has the choice of two channels through which to negotiate. They can negotiate and deal primarily through the resident Ambassador of the other country in Washington, or through their Ambassador in the capital of the other country. By and large, most governments, I

think, follow the practice of choosing the particular channel for predominant communication with the other government which has proved the most effective and reliable and rapid.

The Ambassador today has, I think it is agreed, less opportunity and less scope for independent decisionmaking in the field. He has gained, I think, in importance in the role as adviser.

I never resented the fact that any significant decision had to go back to Washington because with the complication of the position of the United States as leader of the free world, with the multiplication of countries with whom we deal, with the development of extensive forums for multilateral diplomacy, with the march of science, with the cold war, and other complications, it is impossible that anyone not in Washington can fully relate, on any important matter, the significance of the local problem, as seen by the man on the spot, to the overall relationship.

I think, however, the Ambassador in his role of increased importance as chief adviser to the Secretary and the President can capitalize on this situation, or he can, in effect, default on it.

I think he is bound, if he is going to be a successful Ambassador, to express his views thoughtfully, and forcefully, and based on a genuine knowledge of the subject and of the country in which he is operating, including the political and other forces at work locally.

That is a long answer to a short question. I make one other point though:

I, myself, have never experienced, either traveling with any of the Secretaries of State abroad, or as the recipient of visits by Secretaries of State at my post abroad, any case where the position of the Ambassador was damaged by such a visit.

Every Secretary of State I have served with has quite properly, you might say, gone out of his way to impress on the host government the degree of confidence which the Government reposes in the Ambassador on the spot. This has been, in the long run, I think, helpful rather than destructive to the proper role of the Ambassador in the world today.

Senator JACKSON. Has the Ambassador's executive management role increased?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Oh, tremendously.

Senator JACKSON. This is one of the significant new developments, isn't it, especially since the cold war?

Ambassador MERCHANT. The increased variety and number of tools to support and reinforce our foreign policy in a particular country has not only increased, but it has opened up a number of important technical fields.

The whole field of USIA and the field of public relations and cultural impact is involved. There is the whole concept of economic aid and assistance, and military aid and assistance, just to name a few.

This means that modern ambassadors have a highly specialized and diversified organization over which they must preside. I think in large part, the measure of his success is determined by how good an executive he is, how competent he is to relate operations and decisions in one field, maybe a highly technical one, to the total objectives of the foreign policy of the United States, in the country of his residence.

Senator JACKSON. So it is not just a job of knowing the country. It is also a job of understanding the team responsibility, and how to get along and to relate the conflicting points of view that are bound to exist in country team operations, where the departments themselves in Washington are not always in agreement.

Ambassador MERCHANT. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. Do you feel that the ambassador can do a tremendous amount in the field of foreign affairs, if he has the ability and initiative and will not default on his opportunities? Do you believe a modern ambassador has a tremendous opportunity to do a responsible and effective job?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Obviously, there is a difference in individuals, and much depends on the ability of the individual ambassador to get hold of the situation, to take command and be in a position to be the representative of the U.S. Government in that country and have the confidence of the Secretary of State.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I agree completely.

Senator JACKSON. And the confidence of the President.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Our subcommittee's recent staff report, "The Secretary of State," includes this passage, and I will quote it:

In the cold war the ability to act and react quickly is one of our most powerful weapons. A prompt move can dispose of a crisis right off the bat. But if officials are occupied in following routines, respecting petty procedures, chasing around for one concurrence after another, and spending hours in committee meetings until every last voice is heard, then the opportunity to act in time is lost. A stale product is the natural offspring of bureaucracy.

Would you comment on the way our Government takes so much time to make up its mind, and what, in your judgment, is needed to speed up the policy process?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well, I think primarily it is a question of good people and trusting them, delegating authority and standing back of them, replacing them if they don't perform.

A lot of this problem, of course, is just inherent in the complexity of modern life and the responsibilities under which the U.S. Government has to operate. I have not been one who has automatically condemned all committees. In fact, I am probably more favorable to committees in Washington as a coordinating device than many of your witnesses have been, Senator.

I think there are two prerequisites, though, to the utilization of the committee form of arrival at a properly rounded and considered decision affecting more than one department or agency. The first is that, if it is in the general area of foreign policy, any committee should be chaired by a State Department representative and he should be a good man. He should be a strong chairman, with clearly established authority.

Senator JACKSON. And the ability to make a decision.

Ambassador MERCHANT. The ability to make a decision and not to accept the lowest common denominator of a group of men whose direct and proper interests vary enormously.

The second thing is, I think, that you should abolish all committees, say, once every year, and then only reestablish those which are clearly

justified—where the need is clearly justified. The great damage of committees that I have seen has been where the membership is so wide and there are so many representatives whose interests are only peripheral or occasional, yet each member of the committee gains a vested interest in the continuation on a regular formal basis of the life of the committee.

There is nothing more interesting—foreign affairs is the most fascinating subject in the world—and if you walk down the street, I think most people who have never had any responsibility in the field would automatically say, if they had to have a job in the Government, that they would take Secretary of State. This extends to other departments and agencies of the Government.

So I think it is important that periodically you eliminate every committee and then only reestablish it if the need is justified and reestablish it with a membership which is properly concerned with the principal business of the committee.

Secondly, as I say, you need a strong and effective chairman who will make decisions.

Senator MILLER. I would like to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, this question:

What can be done to make this role of adviser more effective? I wonder if you would be good enough to go at it from two standpoints: First, at the State Department level. For example, it has been suggested to us before that there be more direct contact between the ambassador and the top people in State. This is just an example, and I would like to have your own comments.

Then the second approach would be at the ambassadorial level. Your answer just a moment ago possibly would have a bearing on that. It has been suggested, for example, that the ambassador remain in the country for a longer period of time than is presently the case. That is just an example.

I might say that I am thoroughly in agreement that the role of adviser is much more important today, and it seems to me that perhaps the role is not being implemented to the fullest. What could be done about that?

Could you talk from those two approaches?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well, on the first observation which you made, Senator, concerning increased contact with the high officials of the Government, I feel strongly that there should be a frequent opportunity for ambassadors to return from their posts to Washington on consultation, for a period of maybe a week or 10 days. This is expensive, in the case of long-distance posts it is time consuming, but I am satisfied that unless you periodically and frequently, as an ambassador, reimmerse yourself in both the atmosphere and the stream of policymaking in Washington, you can become quite rapidly removed from reality.

Moreover, I think the signature at the bottom of an ambassador's telegram is or can be certainly more impressive with the President and the Secretary and the top hierarchy of the Department and the top officials of other Government agencies principally concerned if there is a continuing, personal, restored relationship.

As a further device for improving this contact and improving the ability of an ambassador to give reasonable advice and improving the



willingness of the policymaking officials in Washington to listen to his advice, I think the regular regional ambassadorial meeting held in the field and attended by high officials of the Department and other agencies and departments is an extremely valuable device.

It has the added virtue of giving each ambassador, as a result of the meeting, an increased realization of the regional interconnection and interrelationship of the problems he is dealing with.

So I would emphasize, even though it is expensive, the importance of regular—and I am thinking of two or three or even four times a year—returns to Washington for brief consultation, and the opportunity to discuss problems and his point of view with the top officials here in Washington.

Senator JACKSON. Secretary Harriman emphasized that point strongly, as I recall. This is one of the problems in the State Department budget at the present time. With jet travel, you can move pretty fast these days.

Senator MILLER. You mentioned regional meetings. Those would probably not be quite as expensive, but how often do you think those should be conducted?

Ambassador MERCHANT. At least once a year, and it would be useful, I think, particularly where the area is distant and obscure, maybe to hold them twice a year. I tried to hold them in Europe twice a year and we weren't successful in averaging more, I don't believe during my tenure in that position, averaging more than once every year or 15 months. This was entirely due to fiscal or budgetary considerations.

On the second point, which I think is a good one, Senator—the length of time in office—I think on balance we do keep our ambassadors too briefly at a post. One usually has to be at a post at least a year before one has gotten one's bearings, and established one's relationships, and sensed the important people that you want to cultivate and develop, and established your own rating system for the validity of the information and the soundness of the judgments that you extract, and learned the country and its problems.

This takes at least a year. Certainly it should involve travel and avoidance of just a dependence on the rather incestuous diplomatic foreign office group which you tend to find in any capital.

I think statistically, on the average, we shift our ambassadors too frequently. I don't believe myself, however, in the validity of the practice of the Swiss and the Norwegians, for example, who tend to keep an ambassador for 10 or 15 or maybe 20 years at a single post. I think probably the optimum period is somewhere around 4 or 5 years, unless the post is of such hardship and difficulty with respect to health conditions that this is unwise.

I think after an ambassador has been at his post 3 years, if you are sitting back in a position of authority in Washington, in the State Department, I think that you want to watch pretty carefully the tone of his reporting and advice, because it is inevitable that ambassadors, being human beings, tend, after the period of novelty has passed, to take on one of two colorations: either they become excessively frustrated and annoyed with the government to which they are accredited, or they become such lovers of the people and the government of the country to which they are accredited that their judgment and their advice is biased in the other direction.

So I think rather than just looking at it from statistics or saying that we will have 5-year terms and only death or treason will shorten it, I think you must take into account the performance of the man in the role and the purely physical conditions which will otherwise, in a different fashion, affect his ability to perform.

Senator MILLER. Thank you. I hope you will excuse me. I have another meeting at 10 o'clock and I can't stay. It has been nice meeting you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador MERCHANT. It is nice meeting you. Thank you.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure to be with you. In a personal way, I see some parallels in that we both seem to have a Princeton and an investment banking as well as a State Department Foreign Service background, although you went further in these fields. It is a great pleasure to be here.

The classic functions of the Ambassador abroad are to be in charge of representation, negotiating, and reporting for our Government, but I have noticed in the last few years a fourth function creeping in that usually involves more people, more paperwork, and more time, in many cases his, and that is the function of administration.

My own view, I know, is that the Foreign Service itself, and this is the view of many men in it, could be smaller in size than it presently is, because size engenders size, and Parkinson's law usually applies.

I was wondering what your view is with regard to the increasingly large number of administrative counselors, and administrators, to administer the administrators. I wonder if you have any thoughts on this subject?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I think, myself, that there has been in the last 20 years a disproportionate numerical growth in the administrative side of our missions abroad. The problem is, of course, a complex one, and there is ample justification for an expansion on that side of the organization.

Having made my first statement, however, I think that we should remind ourselves that a large part of the administrative staffs of the Department of State, in our missions abroad, are concerned and necessarily justified by doing housekeeping and administrative work for related or attached agencies.

I dug out 2 days ago, in anticipation of coming up here, some figures which the committee no doubt has on one or two of our largest Embassies. They are always revealing, I think. If one takes the Paris Embassy, there is a total personnel in the Embassy, including locally employed members of the staff, of just about 1,000 people. The entire Foreign Service staff, which includes officers, Reserve officers, staff corps clerks, communicators, and so forth, is only 104.

Now, a very high proportion of the number of administrative personnel supplied by the State Department to the Paris Embassy are primarily concerned with doing the housekeeping for the long list of other governmental agencies which are attached to the Embassy or incorporated in it.

In addition, I think, another element which is overlooked in accounting for some of this growth, at least, is the increase in travel which the jet airplane has produced. One sees it in congressional travel, and one sees it in increased travel of the Secretary of State, and his staff, and top assistants. One sees it in increased numbers of international conferences.

When you come to a post which is always in the public eye, such as Paris, and if one goes in for a week on a mission or to attend a conference, one may be surprised at the number of chauffeurs and extra clerks on the administrative staff and one overlooks the fact that as soon as you leave, another party is going to come in, and this is a continuous burden placed on many posts on the main travel routes.

Notwithstanding, I do feel that the growth on the administrative side has been disproportionate to the growth on the substantive side.

Senator PELL. On the substantive side, would you think that the present size of the Foreign Service Officer Corps is about right? Could it be smaller, or should it be larger from the viewpoint of the effective performance of the Nation's business? I am talking here not of specialists, but of the FSO's.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I am inclined to say, Senator, that I am not at all sure I am competent to have an opinion, but I am inclined to say that the present Foreign Service Corps is on the low side rather than the high side, given our responsibilities. I think one might over the years want somewhat to change its composition, which could only be done by starting at the recruiting level and you might say at the training and career development level. Any basic reorientation of the Foreign Service will require 20 years before the result is fully reflected. By that time the circumstances may have changed, of course.

I think it is now about right. I think that we went a little too far under the Wristonization program in blanketing into the Foreign Service a number of people who occupied positions of great importance in Washington, where the occupants developed a very high degree of expertise and accumulated a great deal of experience. By forcing some of these people into the Foreign Service and sending them out to the field, you put some square pegs in round holes and went too far in that direction.

I think this is being corrected and I think that we should accept the fact that there should be a permanent civil service staff of some reasonable proportion in the State Department.

Senator PELL. When you talk about the complexion of the Foreign Service, are you thinking there that there might be merit in returning to the concept of specialists in the field, as opposed to those who are supposed to be generalists?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well, I found in this subcommittee's report on the Secretary of State, for the first time I think, in my consideration and discussion of the subject, on many occasions, a statement on the relationship of specialists to generalists with which I totally agreed.

The burden of this statement, of course, was that you should attempt to develop in the early stage of a man's career a specialized knowledge for which he has some talent, or bent, or interest, and give him an understanding in depth of that area.

Then assuming that he has the other qualities and the necessary potential for growth, you should develop him into a generalist rather than start at the bottom and say, "We are going to have all generalists," or start at the bottom and say, "We are going to have certain commercial specialists and financial specialists and specialists in communism, and political specialists," and then expect them to make their

maximum individual contribution to the U.S. Government by honing that one specialty and trying to invent ways in which you can give them satisfaction in rank or salary, at the end.

I think this would lead to disaster in the Foreign Service. You would have a group of sabertoothed tigers who were so overspecialized that they became obsolete because they reached the point where they could kill anything in the jungle, but no longer could eat or chew what they killed.

Maybe I am prejudiced because I came into the Department and the Service in a wartime economic job, for the duration of the war. I never got away and I never regretted it. But in those days, the Foreign Service was smaller, there were 600 or 700, and it was still run pretty much in the old European prewar style of diplomacy. The Department had in those early days of the war and through the war, I think, considerable difficulty in accommodating itself to the new tools that were invented or conscripted to execute our policy abroad.

I was labeled, quite obviously. I came from Wall Street and I had had some economical and fiscal background in international affairs. I was labeled as the economic type, and in those days anyone who was the economic type was instinctively anxious, if he had any ambition, to become a political type, because they got to the top of the ladder and found greater satisfactions and opportunities to use their talents.

Senator JACKSON. I can't think of a better background and training for the job of being a generalist in the broad area of national security than investment banking—

Ambassador MERCHANT. I think that this is true.

Senator JACKSON (continuing). Because you are dealing with many different and conflicting elements that you somehow have to put together.

Ambassador MERCHANT. That is right. I think one of the greatest talents required—and possibly one has to be born with it but it can certainly be developed by experience—the greatest talent, certainly in the field of foreign affairs, for anyone to hold a real position of responsibility, is the ability unconsciously to synthesize a wide variety of factors and elements and see the interaction and interrelationship of one action on areas which at first glance don't seem to be associated.

But if I can finish this, the specialist, having benefited from acquiring a knowledge in depth of some important field, and if he has the talents, should be given the opportunity to develop into a generalist.

When I said earlier that I think that you have to start with recruiting ultimately to develop the Foreign Service with the necessary talents, I think what I primarily had in mind is that there are so many more fields of possible specialization today than there were in any foreign service of any country 20 or 25 years ago.

For example, I don't see how any Foreign Service officer can hold an important post today and prepare himself for more important posts if he hasn't some understanding of nuclear physics, and atomic science, and some conception of space.

This is just one example of absolutely new areas which are going to impinge on foreign policy and international relationships. The whole economic field is breaking down, I think, into broader areas—areas of fruitful study and application—and I think that you have to get these

bright young men in the Service and make sure that you spread them around and give them the opportunity to develop specialties which would have been completely unorthodox or considered irrelevant 20 years ago, if you are going to produce the men at the end of the pipeline with the necessary brand of understanding in the modern world.

Senator PELL. A passing thought here. Realizing that we think our present Ambassadors are the finest in the world—and I think many of them are—I believe some of our old career Foreign Service chiefs of missions prior to World War II, and I am trying not to think of my father who, although he had earlier passed the diplomatic examination, was a political chief then, were as fine and able as the men we have today and they came out of that rather obscure system. You can't find men today who are better than were Phillips or Castle or Welles.

Ambassador MERCHANT. That is true.

Senator PELL. It is very difficult to emulate them today with all of this new, changing emphasis.

Another thought in recruiting. I am wondering what your views are. Very often young Foreign Service officers come here on the Hill and we all try to give them a few words of wisdom. One thought strikes me: Many of them are really going into the Foreign Service with the thought that someday they will be ambassadors, and yet you look at the actual numbers who are in the Foreign Service, numbers with which you are more familiar, and the number of countries, and you find the chance of being an ambassador is akin to that of an Annapolis graduate becoming an admiral.

A similar way of life, I believe, would be the clergy, whose life is one of service, movement, human contact, and discipline. Many, as a rule, don't go into the clergy to become bishops. They go into it because they like the way of life. And this, I believe, should be the basic motivation for going into the Foreign Service.

I was wondering if you thought anything could be done to change this impression young FSO's have of their ambition to be an ambassador. Perhaps their ambition could be more directed to the acceptance, enjoyment, and fulfillment of life as a career Foreign Service officer. You don't tell every young clergyman that he can or should want to become a bishop.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I guess this involves a position of personal philosophy or a certain point of view.

Senator PELL. And it can involve many frustrated men who don't achieve it.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes, it can. I think the "primary" motivation, and I don't like that word, but the "primary" motivation that one should look for and be satisfied exists in every candidate for the Foreign Service is a desire to serve his country rather than to attain glory.

I think in addition, for the Foreign Service, one has to have a sense of adventure which will sustain him over the hardships and the difficulties and the inconveniences, and even the dangers of the career.

I think, however, with young men particularly, you should also have a proper measure of decent ambition. I doubt that you get your best service unless most of the youngsters who enter at the bottom of the ladder have the honest, decent desire to attain the highest rung.

Now, you are quite right. This can lead to frustration. But I think as a man matures, and in fact I personally think the sign of maturity in a man is when he comes to terms with himself in objective judgment on where his talents entitle him to go, once he has made that judgment, which some men make earlier than others, and some men we all know never make—if he makes that adjustment, then you are not going to have dissatisfied, unhappy class I officers just because they haven't been appointed ambassadors and never will be.

But if you are going to insure this, any administration has to do something more than has been done so far, I think. It has to give more of a sense of dignity and worth to important and vital jobs which have to be done, by experienced, senior officers, jobs which don't carry with them the glory and the prominence and the perquisites of a chief of mission.

For example, there is a very small thing, which I have long felt—and incidentally a great deal has been done in the last few years on this particular point—but I think, for example, that no man should retire from the Foreign Service after, say, 30 years, or 25 years of devoted service to the Government, as, say, a class I or class II officer who has never hit the top hierarchical rank—he shouldn't be permitted to retire without the Secretary of State or, in his absence, the Acting Secretary of State, taking 5 minutes to call him into his office and hold a little bit of a ceremony.

We all know how much human beings rely on a sense of being appreciated. There are many things like that—petty things, for example. I think a Foreign Service officer who has retired—and I believe this is not permitted now by the regulations—should be allowed to have in retirement the satisfaction and the sense of achievement which would come just from the notation in his passport that he is a retired Foreign Service officer of the United States of America.

There are so many things like this which aren't very time consuming or very radical, but which can give a sense of satisfaction and substitution for trappings of high office.

Senator PELL. In connection with that, as you probably realize, ex-ambassadors receive Government passports, but ex-ministers do not. It is a very interesting distinction. This is the kind of thing that is utterly artificial and could be changed very easily, so that they both received special passports.

Do you know the reason for this differentiation?

Ambassador MERCHANT. No, I don't, Senator. The regulations have recently been changed to enable retired Foreign Service officers of the rank of career ambassador, or career minister, or class I, if they have held the rank of ambassador, to receive and retain in retirement diplomatic passports.

Senator PELL. That is official passports, or diplomatic?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Diplomatic passports. This is a development of the last few months. I don't think it is so important that they should have diplomatic passports. You do get into difficulty if you have a great many diplomatic passports floating around the world for people who aren't, in fact, on diplomatic missions for the Government, but I was saying I thought every retired Foreign Service officer in his regular passport should have this notation. It is a small thing, but it means a lot.

Then another thing that I think can be done in this area of assuring that you retain the most effective performance from officers who are reaching the higher ranks and holding responsible jobs, but are not going to become chiefs of mission or hold posts comparable in importance; I think you can make sure that a minimum of those situations are due to thoughtless or imperfect career planning through the whole course of their career.

Great emphasis, rightly, is now being given to this in the Department. I think of one Foreign Service officer who retired about the same time I did who was a consular officer in charge of a relatively small consulate in Canada. He had had 32 years in the Service. He was a man of industry, of intelligence, engaging personality, and complete dedication to the Government, and he was only about 50 when he retired.

But I looked up his career, because I couldn't understand why this man hadn't gone where I thought his natural talents entitled him to, and I found something out in this exceptional case, which illustrates how I think the Government can waste potential by thoughtlessness or inadequate attention.

Of his 32 years in the Service, all of them had been spent in consular work. Fifteen of them had been spent in various consulate posts in Mexico. He had had 5 years in the consulate visa section in the Embassy in Buenos Aires. The remaining 12 years of his service had been in consular posts in five different cities in Canada.

Senator JACKSON. What happened in the promotional system?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I don't know.

Senator PELL. This brings up a very interesting point that the committee has been pursuing—I don't mean to speak for my colleagues on it—but certainly I have been bothered by it. We have been trying to get the facts from the State Department as to the number of promotions of those whose service has been mainly consular as opposed to political or economic and others. The consul is the real generalist of the Foreign Service; he is in charge of his little post and in daily contact with the functions of representation, negotiation and reporting.

We cannot get these figures out of the Department of State after, as I recall, two efforts we have made now. I wonder if we could make a third effort.

Senator JACKSON. We will keep digging.

Senator PELL. All right, but it ties so very neatly in with Ambassador Merchant's thought here.

Senator JACKSON. Is this individual otherwise in your judgment quite a competent person?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Extremely competent.

Senator JACKSON. And he should have been in the other areas of service?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I felt that he obviously should have had the opportunity to develop other talents, to poke his head up above the water level and to have more opportunities for a still further development of talent which I thought existed there.

Another thing which I have always been prejudiced in favor of is when you have a young officer in the middle grades who maybe has made a name for himself in political reporting or economic reporting,

and has served in a number of large embassies, and is tagged as an officer who has the potential, really, to go right on up to the top, I have always felt that one should use our consular posts as a proving and testing ground to see whether at this relatively early age for senior responsibility he possesses or can develop the particular administrative talents that can only be developed, I think, under actual pressure and performance.

In other words, give him his own post at an early age, a consular post. He will learn an awful lot, and he will learn one very important side of the Foreign Service responsibilities, which are the consular functions, and he will learn that, if he has never had a post in a visa division or a consulate before, he will be responsible for his own show and you will know in a year or two whether he has the qualities of executive ability and leadership and versatility which can only be tested when you put a man in charge of something.

I think you will find out earlier who your future stars are going to be, or maybe detect some men that seem to be headed for the stratosphere who have got weaknesses which will have to be corrected or they will fail in a more important post later on.

Senator PELL. To go on to the next thought here, do you believe that the economic and foreign aid functions should be combined?

Ambassador MERCHANT. In principle, I do, although I am not sure that my experience is sufficiently up to date for me to have a valid opinion on this. Certainly in my experience, which was when I was most concerned with this problem, primarily in the late forties and the early fifties, I found that in embassies of which I had knowledge, where the counselor for economic affairs was concurrently named the chief of the ECA mission, or alternatively where a qualified ECA mission chief was named also concurrently as counselor for economic affairs in the embassy, that this was the best arrangement.

Now, I can see today, under some of our highly specialized and extensive programs, where this wouldn't be desirable. But in principle—in the field—I think that the maximum unification you can achieve, the better it is.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Going back for 1 second to your thought about giving potential chiefs of missions consular posts, I would like to express my own personal support of that. I remember establishing a consulate general many years ago, and there is no more challenging job, or greater fun than for a young man to have one.

Going to the question of the role of ambassador as an adviser, what would you think of the idea of the desk officer being raised in the Department of State to virtually the ambassadorial level, and perhaps returning to the thought we used to have in the thirties. As we all know most State Department reorganizations are just returns to previous organizations. My thought here is to return to the idea of eliminating the Office Director level and having the desk officers reporting directly to the Assistant Secretaries.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well, I am not quite as concerned as I would infer, from the report of this subcommittee, the subcommittee is, with the problem of layering. I think when you list the desk officer and Deputy Director of Office, or Director and on up, that this incorrectly reflects what the real situation is. I think instead of



having nine layers, in fact you only have three or four, in that the Deputy Officer Director is not an additional hurdle to surmount before you get to the Office Director, if you are a desk officer. They are really alter egos, and I think you should regard it this way.

I am afraid that if you eliminate the office level in the present organization of the State Department, you will overburden the Assistant Secretary level. Take the Latin American Bureau, where there are 21 countries. You have 21 desk officers reporting to the Assistant Secretary, even though you upgrade and put senior officers in and do all you can to promote their authority in the hierarchy, the desk officer by definition is going to be absorbed in the particular country problem. If you then go to the Assistant Secretary, the whole burden will fall on one man of correlating, relating and screening, and exercising a variety of judgments on 21 man-eating tigers. Now, I think that there is a level you can insert, which currently exists in the Office Director, where you go through the preliminary process of relating the problem of Brazil to the relationship with the Organization of American States and Brazil's neighbors, and assure that you aren't pursuing a particular country policy which is going to lead to great difficulty in other relationships or in other arenas.

So I think, Senator, to answer your question more concisely, I think you should have senior officers, with a conscious effort to build up their position of authority and influence at the desk level, and I don't think an ambassador who has had one post—maybe a relatively young ambassador—should feel that he was being discarded or downgraded if he was named a desk officer on an important country desk. I agree with all of this.

But I still think that you have to reduce the burden on the Assistant Secretary by a fairly wide screen to insure that he isn't overburdened and working 22 ineffective hours a day; just as the Assistant Secretary must apply to the problems that come to him a finer meshed screen, so that the Secretary and ultimately the President are not overburdened with the countless number of decisions to be made.

Senator PELL. Returning to one point you mentioned earlier, where you said that properly handled the visits of the Secretary of State far from detracting from an ambassador's role can actually build it up. I was wondering what your view was with regard to the occasional custom of sending out special ambassadors to negotiate treaties or solve problems when there is already a competent resident ambassador.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I think this is a diplomatic tool or device which should be used very rarely, and in consciousness of the fact that inevitably, unless great care is exercised, it is going to impair the position of the ambassador in the country in question. I think there are occasions where a particular situation requires and justifies it, but if I was Secretary of State I would use it very, very sparingly.

Senator PELL. And do you have any thoughts on the proposed Government Foreign Service Academy? What are your views?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well, to eliminate one concept which I think should be thoroughly discarded, I think it would be an enormous mistake to pursue a project for a Foreign Service Academy, comparable to the Air Force Academy and West Point and Annapolis to turn out bright, young, class 8 officers. I think this really does not have to be argued.

Now, I think that there is a very important role for an institution—call it the Foreign Service Institute if you will—a role which cannot be fully provided by the facilities which our great universities afford for either a year of academic training in some specialty or for a year of more, broader generalized training. I do think that there are problems for not only the Foreign Service but for all Government personnel who are going to serve abroad, which can best be dealt with at a level somewhere between higher education and training in particular technical skills—which can best be provided by a Government institution, created for that purpose and given the necessary funds and facilities.

I think the Foreign Service Institute has done an extraordinary job. I think it has been handicapped by lack of adequate funds. I think it has been handicapped by two other things in achieving its full potential. The first is the self-respect—and the proper self-respect—that can come from operating in physical surroundings, which do proper dignity to the importance of its job.

Senator PELL. You mean not in a garage?

Ambassador MERCHANT. The second thing is, there are other things which I think might be changed in the concept of a new Foreign Service Institute or an expanded Foreign Service Institute or an Academy—the name isn't important.

I think the purely clerical skills in which some courses have been given, accountancy and this sort of thing, should be turned back to the relevant agency or department to handle in its administrative sections, so that there would be a proper atmosphere of professional training and study in the Institute as a whole.

Another point where I think that it has not been able to develop its full potential and on which it should have support is the ability to recruit a small but powerful nucleus of top people from academic life, from the universities.

This would require several things being done. I think it would require giving the Institute or the Academy greater status, which would involve the type of board of governors or supervisors or trustees it might have, and a larger budget and, even more important, provide an enticement for top people in our academic world in the form of opportunity to engage in certain research projects in which senior Foreign Service officers attending the Institute or the Academy would also participate.

I think there is a unique opportunity for professors of political science, say, from our great universities, to spend a year or 2 years in Washington having access not just to more material not normally available to the public but to working in close correlation and connection with senior diplomats, experienced in the field.

And let this be on a rotating basis.

Senator JACKSON. You would strengthen the Foreign Service Institute?

Ambassador MERCHANT. This is one way of saying it, and I would do it and do it generously and significantly.

Senator JAVITS. If you will yield, I would like to see the Institute beefed up, personally, and I have been very loath to be for an Academy because of the institutional inservice character of the thing which I thought in the case of the Foreign Service might give it a kind of

attitude of an exclusive club—unless you wore the ring you didn't belong.

I think quite unlike the armed services, this would be bad, and not good. So I would say this is a very fruitful idea—the possibility of really taking the Institute, an established agency, and making something of it.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes, and Senator it would do a great deal more than just give training and an opportunity to broaden the intellectual horizons of the Foreign Service. The Institute already, as you all know, has a very high proportion of its attendance from the other Government departments and agencies involved in one phase or another of foreign relations. This should be continued. I would not want to see it just a State Department or a Foreign Service body.

Senator PELL. You put your finger on one point, to my mind, that is so important, and that is you would get your professors, your top professors, down here on a rotating basis. The proponents of the Foreign Service Academy seem to have lost sight of the fact that it would prove very difficult to get top flight educators to come to the State Department for educational purposes, as opposed to research or political purposes, on a permanent basis to work for a Government academy. Excuse me, I have taken too long.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Ambassador, your remarks have certainly been very rich and rewarding. I have, perhaps, just a question or two which might enable you to elaborate a little more at length on some of the subjects so ably brought up by my colleague from Rhode Island.

As you know, our foreign aid program has been under reasonably heavy attack in these Halls. The suggestion has been made that the separate aid organization be incorporated into the State Department procedures and administration. Would you care to comment on that?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I am talking here as an individual, obviously. I think over the years, I have been mentally on both sides of this question, but I am now settled pretty firmly on the conviction that the aid organization should be a separate organization. There is no question, however, that it should be very clearly and effectively under the policy domination or guidance of the Department of State. It is an instrument, I think, of foreign policy and that would then follow.

I think this is an area where it is almost impossible to draw up the ideal chart of organizational relationships which will be guaranteed to work. I think it depends enormously on the temperaments, the personality, and the point of view and the discipline of the members of the State Department and of an independent economic aid organization.

One great difficulty, and this is a truism, of course, but one of the greatest difficulties that our aid organization has had over the years and I think probably increasingly with the years, is the uncertainty of life expectancy which makes it difficult to recruit—except on a fleeting basis—good men from outside the Government or to keep good men who have been developed in the organization itself. In fact, I think that this probably is the best argument for those who would support the merger or incorporation of the aid organization into the

Department of State. I think it would give an institutionalized sense of permanency which is necessarily lacking in an organization which lives from year to year, as to size of organization and purpose, and so forth.

I would keep them separate, but I would have it clearly understood that foreign policy as formulated by the Secretary of State, and his authorized senior subordinates, would control its policy.

I think also one can, and I believe this is now being done—I know it is being done to a high degree with the personnel abroad of the USIA—I think to the maximum extent possible the AID personnel serving overseas should operate under the identical or virtually identical regulations as the Foreign Service. There should be comparable salaries for comparable responsibilities and comparable allowances and so forth, and so on.

Senator JACKSON. One of the problems in the foreign aid field, if I may interject a comment, is that we have been treating it on a year-to-year basis, and the best people have shied away from getting into the aid program. The result is that we have not always had first-rate personnel in that program. On the contrary, I think recent administrations have been guilty of a little politics—putting people in the aid program for a temporary period who have no understanding of the other problems and fields that are very closely related to the administration of aid and which are important.

Foreign assistance started out as a program which was going to last a year or two. People who wanted to make a career of Government service have shied away from the aid program. We lost a lot of good people that otherwise would have been in it.

Ambassador MERCHANT. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. Administrations are always clearing a bunch of people out and bringing another platoon in, and so on.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I agree with that.

Senator JACKSON. So something needs to be done to provide more encouragement for good people to get into the foreign aid program—which is one of the most difficult areas we have, probably, in the foreign relations field, especially with Congress.

Senator PEEL. And rather than transferring to Foreign Service or somewhere else, then?

Ambassador MERCHANT. It is very difficult to recruit good young men for AID.

Senator JACKSON. All they have to do is read the headlines.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes, and I know there are congressional difficulties in this connection. I am not sure that I know exactly what they are. But I have thought for a long time, not only in connection with insuring the best organization and personnel in the AID organization, but from the point of view of our foreign relations, it would be highly desirable to have authorization acts for a period longer than 1 year and have the annual appropriations. If one embarks on a consortium for a major, long-term project or program of development, in a country like India, or Pakistan, I think we don't obtain the maximum benefit which we are seeking to achieve both for the country and for ourselves in our own interests if it is done on a year-to-year new authorization and then appropriations basis.

The original Marshall plan was for a 4-year authorization, and then an annual appropriation. I think if this philosophy could be

adopted, if it were feasible to adopt it in the Congress, it would help the recruitment and the organization aspects which you raise, Senator, and also it would help the conduct of foreign relations.

Senator BREWSTER. Is the chain of command that you say is so necessary clearly recognized now by the various State Department and AID officials, that is that policy is determined in State?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well, that is the impression that I have, but I have been retired for nearly 2 years.

Senator JACKSON. You have been busily retired.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I haven't found what the engineers call the angle of repose. But my impression and understanding is that the existing relationships between the Secretary and the Director of AID and the principal assistants in both institutions are excellent and effective and that there is no challenge to the authority of the State Department in foreign policy.

Senator BREWSTER. We have seen the proliferation of foreign activities of many U.S. departments, Agriculture, Commerce, and so forth. Do our ambassadors have sufficient authority overseas to control the total U.S. effort in any one country?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I think that they have the authority to do it. I think you can only blame the individual ambassador if he does not run a tight, disciplined, and well-coordinated mission. I think the authority is there, all of the necessary authority is there.

Senator BREWSTER. I am very pleased with that answer. I have one more question. You mentioned that the United States or any country has two avenues of approach in the conduct of its foreign policy, with one other country, i.e., we can work with their ambassador in Washington or we can go through our ambassador over there. Do we have any rule of thumb on that?

Ambassador MERCHANT. No, I don't think so. And I don't mean that the practice either by the U.S. Government or any other government is to utilize one channel exclusively and allow the other to atrophy. It is really a question of the balance of important business, which is done through one or the other channel. I think that there is an understandable tendency by foreign governments to attempt to concentrate their substantive relationships in their ambassador in Washington. This is partly the attraction of strength, and I think it is partly our constitutional system in which the Congress plays such an important element in foreign policy that sophisticated governments want to emphasize the role of their ambassador because of his opportunities to cover all of the centers of power and influence in Washington.

On the other hand, when I was in the State Department there was an instinctive element of self-preservation in attempting to do as much work through one U.S. ambassador in the field as possible. It was, first of all, because it was much easier to crystallize a decision on policy by the device of writing a telegram of instructions and getting the necessary people to clear it than other means of establishing a policy, and secondly, with 104 ambassadors or whatever the number now is accredited to Washington, if you did all of your business through those ambassadors you would not have much time for sleep.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Ambassador, following up what Senator Brewster asked about the problem of an ambassador really being in

control of the country team, isn't there a problem where the loyalty of so many members of the team goes to their own individual department heads?

The budgetary control of those particular staffs is exerted by departments outside of State. I am asking this in an effort to see what might usefully be suggested to enhance the opportunity of the ambassador to really have control.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Well—

Senator JACKSON. In other words, doesn't even a strong ambassador have some real problems in pulling a country team together? Isn't the primacy of an ambassador to some degree a fiction—despite all the directives saying he is the leader?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I think there are only two things that occur to me that can be done to minimize this problem, Senator. The first is to reverse what I sense to be a disturbing trend in the multiplication of departmental foreign services. I think in the history of our foreign service, the great step forward from the Rogers Act of 1924 was the Reorganization Act of 1939 when the foreign service of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture was brought into the Foreign Service.

Too many people fail to recall that it is the Foreign Service of the United States of America. It isn't the Foreign Service of the Department of State. I deplore, frankly, fragmentation and proliferation of foreign services and foreign representatives of other departments and other agencies.

I think if one could establish the principle that the Foreign Service, to the maximum extent possible, serves the needs or should serve the needs of all departments except in the most unusual situations, this would reduce the number of independent elements in our missions abroad.

This is a long-term problem and, as I say, if this trend continues—Agriculture now has its own foreign service and so on—if this trend continues I think it would be a disturbing one.

Senator JACKSON. And there are conflicts of interest, too, because the Department of Agriculture representative, for example, is anxious to carry out the desires of the Department of Agriculture, which in turn may be contrary to our foreign policy.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes, although I am happy to say I never have had that problem with my agricultural attaché. He was one of the most valuable, loyal members of my staff.

The second thing that I think is important and this I suppose only the President, in the last analysis, can do—but certainly the Secretary of State can help and I believe does help and the individual ambassador can do something—and that is when an ambassador is appointed to his post, and periodically when he is back in Washington, I think that he should go around and talk to the heads of the other departments and agencies who have representatives attached to this embassy, and establish the understanding that the head of that other department or agency will without argument withdraw and replace an individual representative of his department or agency if the ambassador discreetly and privately communicates to him that he is dissatisfied with his performance or his attitude or his cooperation in the mission.

Then I think the ambassador is in a position to insure that he has an integrated and cooperative team. Then you give effectively to representatives of the other agencies a sense of uncertainty as to whether their sole source of future preferment is the head of their own agency.

Senator JACKSON. I think this is excellent. You made a point earlier about the need for consultation on the part of the ambassadors with the Department of State.

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. The personal contact is very important. A lawyer can't represent his client unless he has a chance to talk to him. We Senators find it is a bit difficult to represent our clients in our State—that is the people—unless we get back once in awhile to find out what the thinking is and have this kind of personal contact. Without it you will lose the "feel."

Ambassador MERCHANT. There is no substitute for it.

Senator JACKSON. You have made a number of fine and constructive contributions here. I wonder, do you have any further suggestions, in addition to those you have given, whereby the Foreign Service could turn out a larger number of first-rate senior officers who would be able to go to the top and serve as ambassadors?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I don't think so, Senator, other than this. I believe that as an established policy—although sometimes it is impossible due to budgetary considerations—you will develop your best Foreign Service officers and your most effective Department of State if you achieve throughout every officer's career roughly a 50-50 division of service between Washington and the field. I think this is important.

Senator JACKSON. It is a pretty good rule of thumb, you mean?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Yes. I know the first Foreign Service officer I met when I came down to Washington right after Pearl Harbor on this wartime job had been in the Service since 1910. He had just come back from the field a month before, and he was in the temporary division in which I was established. This was his first assignment to Washington since he entered the Service.

Senator BREWSTER. Does this 50-50 breakdown work out numerically, and do you need to have half of your people here in Washington?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I am not sure of that, Senator. I think roughly that order of slots in the State Department are normally filled or could be filled by Foreign Service officers. You are quite right, that this is a cross bearing you would have to take, but I was putting the emphasis more on the individual officer. I think constant reimmersion in the American Government and the American stream of life is an essential to his adequately and effectively representing the United States abroad.

You would have less frustrations in the field, I think, on the part of Foreign Service officers if they really were aware of the unavoidable complexity of the U.S. Government, given its responsibilities in the world.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg, did you have any questions?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Could I say one thing, Mr. Chairman? Going back to the Foreign Service Academy, my basic thought is

that one would want, as I indicated, and one should seek to gain on a rotating basis, the benefit of the experience and knowledge of top people in the academic world. I think this can only be gained in any substantial way on a rotating basis, a year's leave of absence or coming here for a sabbatical or something of that sort.

I would not want to have my answer, however, rule out the desirability of having a very small nucleus—I would think two or three men whose training had been in the academic world primarily—to serve as dean or in some important position in an enlarged or expanded Foreign Service Institute. But I think primarily, this problem of rotation is important.

I had one other point if I could make it, and I am afraid I am keeping you gentlemen, but it is this: I think this comes under the heading of career training. I think it is very important that the Foreign Service, or the Department of State, establish consciously the policy to the extent possible of giving its officers in the Foreign Service a sabbatical year every 7 or 8 years. I think a Foreign Service officer should be taken out of the line of fire and be given the opportunity to reflect and to read and to knock his brains against fresh and different types of brains and to grow and, by a change of field of interest and intellectual activity, become refreshed.

I always used to feel in my tours of duty in the State Department—particularly when I happened to have fairly responsible positions—like a camel living on his hump. You don't have the time to do all of the reading you want to do. Worst of all, you don't have the time to reflect. You don't have the time adequately to relate experiences that you personally have undergone—while they are still fresh in your mind—to something more permanent than just having solved a problem.

I think the senior seminar of the Foreign Service Institute, and I think a year at the National War College are good. I think this sort of experience is essential to developing the type of men that we have to have to formulate and help in formulating and executing a policy.

Senator PELL. Completely agreeing with you, I think these proceedings should show that one way of achieving this would require a simple administrative order by either the Secretary or the President, to the effect that Foreign Service officers are encouraged to go on leave of absence without pay for a year or two if they can find a job in private industry or if the Department can help them find a job. But as you know, if any Foreign Service officer has the temerity to ask to be put on leave of absence without pay for a year or two, it is considered bad school spirit and it is held against him when it comes to promotions, and so nobody does it. If this little action could be taken, this little administrative order would say rather than being held against them, such leaves would be held in their favor. I think we would go along this way at least to a certain degree at no additional cost to the taxpayers.

Mr. ENGBERG. You have stressed a couple of times the need for talent and retaining and developing qualified personnel. One of our previous witnesses from the Department of State suggested or proposed what they are apparently planning to do, that is to establish separate recruitment boards and promotion boards to be used for dif-



ferent specialties. At the top there would be a broad promotion board to consider the more outstanding individuals in each of these specialties for final promotion into class 2 or class 1. Do you think that this is a good suggestion from the standpoint of developing specialized talent and bringing a greater number of qualified individuals into the field?

Ambassador MERCHANT. In principle, I would say "Yes." I think it depends at what stage in a man's career he is given a real opportunity to depart from the practice of his specialty and expand his horizon. You have very real problems in this. For example, the man who is going to be Minister for Economic Affairs in London or Paris or Tokyo or Bonn, say, has to be a man of great experience and long training in economic affairs. Therefore, you have to have, I think, some economic specialists who pursue their specialty for a very considerable portion of their career. And yet, you deprive yourself of maybe some of your best, very top people, if the highest an economic specialist can go is Minister for Economic Affairs, say, in the London Embassy.

I think one way you can deal with this is to give a jump promotion to a man whose specialty has been in economic affairs.

If he goes to London as Minister for Economic Affairs and then if he does a good job there—and it is a big one and will expose his talents or lack of them—then give him an embassy. Don't let that one post be the end of the road for the man whose continuing interest is economics and yet has retained the ambition to hit the rank of career ambassador and of heading his own mission.

So I think probably my answer to you, sir, is that I think this is a useful development and sound principle, but I think that I would establish these boards before the apex of the specialization and give them an opportunity to pick out men and give them another type of experience and another type of job.

Mr. ENGBERG. My next question is in the area of communications. You have implied, as several of our other witnesses have, that true control depends pretty largely upon who can contact whom and in whom confidence exists in this type of communication. One of our previous witnesses pointed out in regard to the layering in the Department of State that the real problem was one of communications. When someone from a foreign field had to contact a desk officer who was on a lower status than he was for a decision, time passed and a decision was held up before it went to the top or to a superior Department of State officer. This was one of the reasons for the suggestion of possibly eliminating the Office Director level.

I give this as background, because this problem of communications is something that this committee has been concerned with for quite some period of time. What would be your suggestion as to how this communications problem in the Department might be improved?

Ambassador MERCHANT. I am afraid I haven't any real suggestions. Certainly I don't believe there is any simple mechanical or organization answer. This really comes down, I think, to the ability of the Ambassador and the ability of every man in the State Department with whom he communicates, whether it be the desk officer or the Secretary himself, to distinguish relative priorities. There are some questions that an Ambassador needs an immediate answer on—matters

of delicacy, and importance—where he is properly justified in sending a telegram to the Secretary asking him to discuss this urgently with the President and let him have his answer.

Then it comes down to crying "Wolf, wolf." This can be abused. In the trade there is an accepted method of indicating the importance of a particular telegram by the use of the perpendicular pronoun. I used it in my telegrams as Ambassador very rarely—the "I"—but when I wrote a telegram in the first person, everybody back in the Department knew that I personally had written it.

Similarly, every Ambassador jumps when he gets an instruction from the Department which is written in the first person. It means that the Secretary himself had dictated it or felt it was so important that he changed "we" of the Department to an "I."

There has to be someone who knows all there is to be known and reads everything available on the subject of every country. This is the desk officer. He is an inch wide and a mile deep. There are some problems, obviously, that have to have a decision which can't wait for the desk officer even to read the telegram, and there are some telegrams that the Secretary of State will require come to his desk automatically, and there will be cases—and I have seen many of them—where the minute he reads the telegram the Secretary personally telephones the President and calls in his secretary, and dictates the answer within 5 minutes.

It is really a question of experience and discrimination and judgment.

Mr. ENGBERG. Isn't there a danger where you have excessive layering that a number of items of considerable interest and of real importance might not get to the top as rapidly as they should?

Ambassador MERCHANT. Not in a well-run State Department, with the right people in the right spots. By golly, they get there. If the desk officer spots something that the President ought to be concerned with that night and the Secretary has to know about at once—if he is any good—he will hand-carry it to the Secretary's office, and tell the Assistant Secretary on the way by that he is doing so. I don't know what the answer really is. I know when I was just Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, in my little message center, outside of my office, I had some statistical sample checks made. I used to average between 14,000 and 15,000 documents a week, just coming to me as head of the European Bureau. This included letters from Senators, memorandums from the AEC, and JCS papers, and telegrams and instructions, and incoming and outgoing airgrams, and internal memorandums and chits from the Secretary, and whatnot.

Well now, obviously, every one of those 14,000 or 15,000 documents was of importance to my responsibility. But it is humanly impossible to read 15,000. I could only read on an average about 100 or 150 telegrams a day. I found I just had to keep it down to that number.

Now, the fellow who screens your telegrams for you, in that office, will control to a large extent what problems are attended to that day. This takes great judgment. The Secretary has to be served by men of discrimination and responsibility and judgment right down to the desk officer, which is a supporting argument for having senior, experienced, talented men right down to the desk level.

But I don't think that there is any easy answer. I think it is a question of training the best human material that you can find into exercising the necessary quality of judgment in order to distinguish the important from the very important and from the trivial and deciding what can wait, and what the President must know within an hour of its arrival in the Department.

Mr. ENGBERG. That brings up the last question I had.

Ambassador MERCHANT. This sounds defeatist but it comes down to men.

Mr. ENGBERG. That is what we want. This brings up another question—

Ambassador MERCHANT. Excuse me, I don't mean to interrupt, but don't misunderstand me. There are things that you can do. There are a lot of things that have been done and maybe we will find other devices. For example, we have the establishment of the Secretary's secretariat, by General Marshall, I think. It was an enormous step forward in the Department of State to insure that the Assistant Secretary concerned and the Secretary and the President were kept as instantly informed of what was truly important as human judgment could devise. And I think that you can make organizational improvements. But fundamentally it comes down to the quality of your men and the existence of judgment.

Mr. ENGBERG. In relationship to this matter of communications, including some of the ideas the committee members have presented about related agencies and the different departments, and in view of your very extensive experience, what is your reaction to a top coordinating agency such as the National Security Council or something similar, in coordinating the entire foreign policy field? We can't get away from the fact that foreign policy and domestic policy in the different departments are all vitally interested in all of these particular situations.

The President has to make a final decision.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I feel very strongly, sir, that under our Constitution and under our traditions and by experience—and thought has been applied to this problem by many people—I feel strongly that nothing should be organizationally done which downgrades the Office of Secretary of State. There is obviously the final role of coordination which could be said to be the marriage, I suppose, of domestic policy, military policy, and foreign policy in dozens of questions a year. Only the President can make these decisions. That is the burden of his Office, or one of the burdens of his Office. To the extent that coordination can and must be delegated in the general field of foreign policy, I think the Secretary of State has to exercise this as the first Cabinet Officer.

I think the President must always support the Secretary of State and the authority of his Office. I think the President obviously must be served by a small but extremely talented staff—but staff and not line people—operating in this complex field of foreign relations, including defense strategy and problems. I think the Secretary of State has to be clearly first among equals. He can't overrule the Secretary of Defense, but I think that the Secretary of Defense in any Cabinet must have a clear understanding of the all encompassing responsibilities of the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State can never overrule the Secretary of Defense and there should be cases where he will persuade him, but if there is a continuing difference of view only the President himself can resolve that. I think it is essential for orderly government under our Constitution that this principle be maintained.

Mr. ENGBERG. That is all, Senator Jackson, and thank you.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Ambassador, in response to the many questions that we have asked you, you have given us much helpful advice and counsel which I trust will reach the right places. We are hopeful that something constructive will come out of the series of hearings that we have held in this field. We are most appreciative to you and grateful.

Ambassador MERCHANT. I am very appreciative of having had a chance to sit here and discuss these important matters. I would repeat, I think the work that your subcommittee is doing, Senator, is of utmost value. You have approached the whole problem so constructively and it is one of the great examples of the unique wisdom of our Founding Fathers, I think, in the Constitution. You are doing something here which I don't think could be done by the executive branch and I don't think it could be done by any outsider—any outside experts or consultants or anyone.

I only hope, and I am sure it will be the case, that to the extent that your conclusions affect the Foreign Service and the Department of State that they will be given the attention they obviously deserve.

Senator JACKSON. We thank you very much. We have been aided by very fine members of the committee and by an excellent staff, which is crucial.

We will, of course, welcome any other comments you might wish to send us, which we could include in our record.

(Text of letter from Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant, March 2, 1964.)

WASHINGTON, D.C., March 2, 1964.

HON. HENRY M. JACKSON,  
U.S. Senator.

DEAR SENATOR: In connection with my appearance before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations on February 27, I did not find the occasion to discuss one matter relating to the organization of the State Department. If there is any appropriate fashion in which this letter could be appended to or otherwise related to my testimony, I would be most appreciative.

I strongly recommend the concept that the existing position of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs be customarily filled by a Foreign Service officer and that the tradition be further established that a change in the incumbent is not made except under unusual circumstances, where there is a change of administration in the White House. I make this recommendation with high admiration for Averell Harriman who now occupies that position and who happily comes as close to being a professional Foreign Service officer as any non-FSO can. And certainly I would not want my recommendation to be construed other than as inaugurating the custom in the future and in normal course.

My reasons for the proposal are twofold. First, it would insure continuity at a very high level in the State Department hierarchy

which would be of particular value when administrations change. Second, it would not only, I believe, improve the morale of the entire Foreign Service but I think in the long run it would favorably affect the quality of young officers being recruited into the Service. I believe that the Foreign Service contains and must in the future continue to seek men of such outstanding ability who are entitled to such an opportunity for recognition of their talents and need to have the possibility of achievement of such a role of responsibility to keep them at full stretch. Incidentally it is a practice long ago adopted and followed by the British and French.

There are several objections which can be raised with this suggestion. The first is that it would be unjust and unfair to the Foreign Service in general and to a Foreign Service officer appointed to the position because of the inevitable exposure to public and at times even partisan attack. My reply is that this sort of heat can equally expose an Assistant Secretary or an Ambassador and yet appointment to such positions of Foreign Service officers is common practice. Moreover I do not know any Foreign Service officer worth his salt who would not philosophically, if not happily, accept such risks in exchange for the satisfaction of serving the country in such high office.

Second, it can be said that there is no assurance the Foreign Service will produce men of the quality and caliber to fill such a responsible office. To say this is contrary to past experience when one considers the success of professional diplomats running from Grew and even earlier Under Secretaries of State on through such men as Doc Matthews and Bob Murphy. I believe the Foreign Service will continue to produce a spate of qualified officers. In any event I am not suggesting that this be made a matter of statute but rather one of practice developing into tradition. This would meet the argument that a time might come when no suitable, qualified officer seemed available.

The third argument against establishing this practice is to cite the obvious right of the President to be served in positions of high responsibility by men of his own choosing. Nothing in my suggestion would prevent a President from making a change whenever he desired for whatever reason. I would, however, submit that wisdom would merely argue against making a change in the holder of this position in the early months of any new administration when the thread of continuing experience is so important in assuring the continuity of coherent foreign policy.

I hope that this suggestion will commend itself to you and your colleagues on the subcommittee. Thank you again for all your courtesy.

Sincerely yours,

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT.

Senator JACKSON. I wanted to state that we will hold the record of this hearing open for a memorandum which we have requested from the Honorable Edmund Gullion, until just recently our Ambassador to the Congo, on the subject of our hearing today.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to call of the Chair.)

(The memorandum of Ambassador Gullion follows:)

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

The subcommittee is happy to be able to include in its record a memorandum by the Honorable Edmund A. Gullion, career Minister, and most recently U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo.

We requested Ambassador Gullion to prepare a statement containing comments on the main points which he thought we should consider and reflect upon, and he has responded with this lucid and thoughtful contribution.

Ambassador Gullion is a career Foreign Service officer of 27 years, who has come up through the ranks to the top position of Chief of Mission. He has served abroad in a series of posts in Europe, the Far East, and Africa, and at home in a variety of assignments in the Department of State, including the policy planning staff.

Ambassador Gullion has just completed a 2½-year tour of duty in one of the Nation's most difficult and sensitive posts—we are grateful that he was able to give us this helpful statement just at this time.

**THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIST IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

**By Hon. Edmund A. Gullion**

(Career Minister and, recently, Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo)

Memorandum for Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations

(March 23, 1964)

**I. THE NEW ENVIRONMENT**

All of us are still under the sway of President Kennedy's powerful, positive concept of the Presidency—a leading, creative, wide-ranging force in American life, culture, government, and foreign affairs.

Mr. Kennedy had a matching concept for the Department of State. From the outset of his Presidency he wanted to restore to it primacy in the conduct of foreign relations. He reversed a tendency to consider the Department as but one of many agencies involved in external affairs. He cut back the undergrowth of interdepartmental committees in the management of foreign policy. He summoned the Department of State to guide the work of other agencies within the framework of that policy.

Part of the Kennedy plan was to strengthen the hands of the American ambassador abroad. In addition to a direct and sometimes disconcerting personal interest in the problems of particular missions, this took the form of explicit instructions from the President enjoining all American ambassadors to grasp leadership of American Government activities in their areas, and to make the best contribution they knew how to policy formation.

If it had become easy to think of the chief of mission as typically the *agent* of policy, reduced by modern communications to the role of mere executant, this was not the Kennedy idea.

Just as he saw the Presidency as a restless, inquiring, energizing force, so he strove to pass this impulse all through the executive chain of command, at home and to our missions abroad.

In this dynamic kind of diplomacy, the chief of mission was to be considerably more than chairman of the board, a distinguished American symbol, a gracious host, and the passive editor of his staff's reporting.

Nowhere was there to be found a greater challenge to an ambassador's creativity, stamina, flexibility and foresight than in new and lesser developed countries.

From 1946 on, as scores of new nations surged onto the world stage, the U.S. Government moved with creditable speed to create pioneer embassies in the new countries. The measure of the gap we had to fill is revealed in the figures:

In 1939 we had 46 diplomatic posts in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. That number has since grown very little. But then we had only 11 posts in Asia and Africa and today we have 64. Even in the brief period since the war, the roster of countries has exactly doubled—from 57 to 114.<sup>1</sup>

The new countries are jealously nationalistic. They are still evolving their own character, institutions, and ways of looking at the outside world, including the United States. They may adhere to patterns inherited from the former colonial power, or they may break sharply with precedent. The only safe prediction for them is their unpredictability.

Looming before them and confusing their choice is the competition between the free world and Communist patterns of social organization.

The conduct of U.S. missions in such countries takes on a character very different from that in more settled areas.

It is no derogation of the major importance for U.S. foreign relations of the great historic capitals, to observe that the U.S. embassy in such places accounts for relatively less of the total contact of the United States with the host country than do American missions in many newer countries of Asia and Africa.

If we conceive of the overall relations of the United States with a given country in terms of a "pie chart," then the section of the pie represented by the U.S. Embassy in London or Ottawa or Stockholm will be relatively small. The widest arc of the pie will be composed of segments representing ties of business-to-business, family-to-family, history-to-history, institution-to-institution, travel and tourism and all the myriad contacts which relate the more established nations in the world community to one another.

But if we consider the Embassy in, say, Amman, or Dar-es-Salaam, or Vientiane, the sector of the pie representing its relative responsibility for contacts with the host government and peoples, it will be seen to take up practically the whole plate.

These new countries comprise the area in which most U.S. economic aid is concentrated. Their borders often constitute the frontier of freedom of which the United States is the principal defender. Yet the unofficial U.S. presence in these areas, our investments, and, often, our knowledge and historic ties are less than commonly supposed.

Most new countries are former colonies. We may have shared some dramatic moments of history with them, but it is sometimes forgotten

<sup>1</sup> "The Reallocation of World Responsibilities," Under Secretary George Ball, Department of State Bulletin, p. 287, Feb. 24, 1964.

how brief the association has been. With no appetite for colonies ourselves (during this century) we did not settle down in other peoples colonies. During the wars we fought in them or traversed them on the way to battle but afterwards we accepted few mandates or territorial acquisitions. Trade, to some extent, followed the flag but investment lagged—at least in Africa and Asia, either for lack of profitable opportunities, or because American settlement and capital was often effectively discouraged by the colonial power.

As a consequence both of this colonial cold shoulder and of the reticence of American risk capital before certain risks, a strikingly uneven pattern of American investment has emerged.

Of some \$35.5 billion invested abroad, the Western Hemisphere (chiefly Canada) and Europe account for \$30,501 million of the total. The remainder is spread through the vast tracts of Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Oceania. If from this group we except the oil-rich lands of Libya and the Middle East, and the more familiar investment areas of Australia, the Philippines, and South Africa, it becomes clear just how minimal U.S. investment is in most of those new countries which are at the same time so decisive in the great political confrontations of our time. (Indeed, the Department of Commerce figures for investment lump most countries of Asia and Africa under the general heading of "Other.")

It is also easy to see why we came to be more characteristically represented, for example, in black Africa and southeast Asia, by missionaries, philanthropic, and educational enterprises, and a few Yankee traders than by large American commercial communities. Even our consular establishments in these areas were sparse and understaffed.

The United States did, however, start with certain advantages. As a former colony ourselves we were assumed to be sympathetic. We had come out of the wars with a reputation for limitless power coupled with a disinterest in acquiring more territory or colonies.

But we had now to accept the risks and penalties that go with close involvement. We were going to have to bear mighty burdens of defense and reconstruction and to make decisions which would affect the daily lives of people from Phnompenh to Zanzibar.

We were bound to step on some toes, to make some mistakes, and to see them magnified by our detractors. The Communist adversary was prompt in acting out his conviction that the road to Paris lies not through Berlin but through Pretoria, Calcutta, and the Congo. He launched a long, audacious and too often successful lie about our motives. He seeks to substitute the mask of imperialism for the image of unselfishness which the once subject peoples formerly had of us.

U.S. diplomacy in the new countries is thus embarked on a beneficent but hazardous enterprise with few guidelines. Much of the program has had to be composed on the spot, revised to meet fast-breaking developments, and then justified to Washington.

The American diplomatic mission, with its attached offices, is the spearhead of this new kind of representation.

How well equipped is the American chief of mission today for this kind of task? What can he contribute to the policymaking process? What should be his relation to his staff, to the Foreign Service, and to the Department?



## II. THE CHIEF OF MISSION

There are too many stereotyped views of the American chief of mission: Hollywood's type casting, the bureaucratic conception, the politician's image, and several others.

Actually, American Ambassadors do not conform to any single model. They may resemble each other to the degree that they share the same general concerns, are advocates for the same client, and use the same professional vocabulary. They are more like each other than they are like the ambassadors from any other country.

But beneath their professional and protective coloration, they are probably a more heterogeneous bunch than a like number of American doctors, lawyers, or merchant chiefs. Get them in a hall together, the long and the short and the tall, and you would be surprised at the variety—probably, also, at how strongly some individual personalities will stand out.

The corps of chiefs of mission is a variegated group—first because it is usually composed of about 60 percent of career men and 40 percent of men appointed from many outside occupations. And among the career men, however much they may have seemed to resemble each other when as young Americans they entered the career, their period of service has served more to bring out differences than it has to press them into a common mold.

Chiefs of mission who are political appointees are supposed to differ from those appointed from the career service. But neither group runs always true to form. The bureaucrat may turn bold and the political appointee may become cautious.

It goes without saying that the ideal chief of mission should have many qualifications, all of them outstanding. But, as in every profession, the ideal is what we fall short of.

It is rare that the same man can be a forceful executive, a creative thinker, a brilliant reporter, a topnotch economist, a wily negotiator, an expert at military affairs, a skillful propagandist, a versatile linguist, and an unusually attractive personality.

Because American missions today are so much larger than they used to be, and include military, public affairs, and economic staffs with big budgets and specific tasks, there has been increasing emphasis on the ambassador as executive.

Strong executive leadership is certainly required. Yet the executive function is still ancillary to the prime requirement in a chief of mission—the ability to comprehend the dynamics of different societies and to influence them in some degree toward U.S. foreign policy objectives. Career ambassadors may have sharpened their talents in this direction by having lived among many different peoples but they have no monopoly on a gift which exceptional businessmen, scholars, writers, and others may also have in high degree.

Excessive specialization is to be deplored. The main thing is for an ambassador to be a broadly cultivated, articulate, strong-nerved, humane being with keen perceptions, the faculty of empathy, and a passionate dedication to U.S. policies.

Although successful ambassadors have come from all walks of life, qualification in the social sciences, particularly in economics, learned either in the marketplace or in academies, seems to this observer most appropriate.

Many different lists of ideal qualifications of a chief of mission could be compiled and each would be more or less valid. Under the American system, probably the outstanding qualification he can bring to his job is the reputation for having the special confidence of the President of the United States. If the ambassador is considered to have been a personal selection of the President he can safely be short a few other specialized qualifications.

Obviously, the President cannot have known intimately all whom he appoints, but the Department, the White House, and the appointee should cooperate to make the relationship more than perfunctory. The President should know his Ambassadors at least as well as he does his top home officials, and generals and admirals.

The Secretary of State, of course, directs and coordinates chiefs of mission in the field. The career appointees, especially, will find it easy to work in the familiar departmental framework. All will do well, however, to recall that the ambassador is regarded in the host country as the President's particular representative and derives his influence mainly from that fact.

The President, of course, can and does repose special confidence in both career men and political appointees. In our Foreign Service, good men do not lack opportunities to distinguish themselves, to become known to the President, and to merit his confidence. This does not mean that the President can or should restrict his choice to the narrow confines of the career and among men whose first qualification for the job was success years ago in competitive examinations.

The chief of mission echelon in the American Foreign Service now represents a good mix of appointees from within and without the Service. Indeed, the vast majority of professional Foreign Service officers prefer it that way, provided that their own path to top posts is not arbitrarily blocked by political appointments, and that no embassy is kept beyond their reach for financial reasons.

The professional career ambassador is likely to bring to his job a wider range of specialized qualifications and to be dealing with problems that are familiar to him from prior service. His professional deformation is likely to be in the direction of passivity or hypercaution, although this stereotype is belied by many distinguished ambassadors.

The political appointee can often exploit a more intimate connection with the national administration and may be less trammled by precedent and the traditional way of doing things; on the other hand he sometimes suffers from trying to do too much too quickly, e.g., striving against reality to compress dramatic, definitive, and popular solutions into his brief fling at foreign affairs.

In the nature of things it is probable that the career service will continue to supply a greater proportion of chiefs of mission for embassies located in emerging countries or behind the curtain or in exotic language areas.

While the requisite skills and background are more consistently accumulated among service habitués, something more than mere professionalism is required.

People in the emerging countries are likely to attribute to the American ambassador a more authoritative role than would be ascribed to his colleagues in more settled areas. Whether Washington

or he wishes it, he occasionally finds himself thrust into something like a pro-consular role. Seen from these regions, Washington appears remote, while the American embassy looms as the present and plenipotentiary arm of the U.S. Government. The ambassador will be looked to for advice on a range of things on which our more established missions would rarely be consulted. At the same time he is much more likely to be accused of interference in domestic affairs. The services he leads may bask in popular favor one day and be alert for brickbats the next.

One of the hazards of the ambassador's life, whether cast among ancient civilizations or in new societies, is that the host government must soon take his measure. In the intensely personal relationships characteristic of formative societies, this will occur sooner rather than later.

A chief of mission in a new country, like any other chief of mission, must strive to keep his objectivity intact, but he must at least be convinced of the validity of the historic process which has brought independence even if its continuum involves some shocks and collisions with established states, including our allies and ourselves. He must be prepared in his professional relations to find the locus and distribution of authority elsewhere than he might suppose merely by scrutiny of the institutional framework inherited from the colonial power.

In trying to bring his influence to bear he may be baffled at first to discover the limitations of certain assumptions cherished in Washington. Without U.S. aid and support to the new countries many of them might have fallen into the bear pit long ago, and we would be exactly nowhere. At the same time, the American chief of mission and the Secretary of State would vastly err if they assumed that the chief of state in a new country is bound to see things our way because of that aid. Intellectually, he appreciates it just as he knows theoretically the importance of foreign opinion. But in many new states the leaders have not had extensive contact with foreign countries beyond the former metropole. Their passionate energies are chiefly reserved for internal political problems and for internal development. They are also likely to be impressed with the liability for them in domestic policies of overt alinement with one side in the cold war.

The chief of mission in the new country will find, therefore, that his credit and influence depend even more than in most places chiefly on personal contacts, psychological manipulations, and intimate understanding of the power struggles in the host country.

It goes without saying that the chief of mission must be prepared for surprises, reversal, an unsettled way of life, and even some discomfort and dangers. But he can also be prepared for an exceptionally interesting tour of duty.

In any country the chief of mission must provide the leadership and interpret the policy as it is going to be applied from day to day in his area. He is responsible, accountable, and expendable.

Within the limits of commonsense and proper delegation of authority, the chief of mission must try to be as big a man as he can.

### III. THE CHIEF OF MISSION AND THE COUNTRY TEAM

A modern, activist chief of mission is more than merely chairman of the board or even primus inter pares. It is up to him to focus the efforts of all U.S. agencies on U.S. objectives. If he has also been

creative and diligent in suggesting and evaluating the objectives, he will be more effective in pursuing them.

The term "country team" originated in application to certain specific combinations of agencies abroad, particularly to joint committees of diplomatic and military representatives concerned with foreign aid. The wise Ambassador will compose the country team according to his own conception of the dimensions and priorities of the task before him. It should be wide enough to cover the principal problems in the country, but not so large as to cripple the team as a decision-making, action-forcing, executive entity.

In the Congo, our team consisted of the Ambassador and his alter ego the deputy chief of mission; the head of the political section; the combined AID chief-economic counselor; the chief of the military mission; one each of the service attachés in rotation; the head of USIA, and, from time to time, guests by invitation. The chief of the Combined Administrative Organization (CAMO) usually attended on this basis.

Not the least important person present, although not a member, is the junior officer serving as rapporteur. The country team meeting should be crisply concentrated on specific actions and assignments. The rapporteur records these assignments, circulates a note of the meeting, and follows up on execution. The chief of mission inventories progress at each successive meeting.

In addition to the country team meeting, and depending upon the press of business and the temperament of the chief of mission, there will be various other fixed or ad hoc meetings as, for example, sessions with military personnel on detailed military problems, and also the usual larger staff meetings. The latter should confirm the entire U.S. staff in its sense of participation.

There is, of course, a golden mean between too many and too few committees.

The country team is the logical center of coordination and review but the chief of mission can make it more than that. As suggested elsewhere in this paper, the chief of mission, especially in emerging countries, has definite policymaking responsibilities. Since Washington policymaking, especially for dependent areas, sometimes boils down to a search for a common denominator amidst the counterplay of agencies and interests, the chief of mission will lend authority to his own recommendations if he can base them upon a good consensus in his country team.

The country team can be called upon for periodic review of the whole range of U.S. Government activities. In Léopoldville we coupled these reviews with forecasts of Congo developments and recommendations for U.S. policy.

The chief of mission may use the country team either in this way, or, at times, he may consider his views will have more weight if he identifies them as coming directly from him. In his cables he may then stoop to use of the first person singular which is normally eschewed.

President Kennedy's instruction to chiefs of mission made clear the distinction between the responsibilities of the chief of mission and those of the commander of any military forces in the area. This distinction should not require rigid abstention by the diplomat from military affairs nor by the soldier from political consultations. By

experience, and because of the elaborate joint training programs of recent years, each should know more than he used to about the other's business. It stands to reason that the chief of mission is not going to interfere in the deployment of troops or the conduct of campaigns and training, but he can help the generals function within U.S. policy. And unless his area is specifically transformed into a zone of the armies and responsibility for civil as well as military policy has been clearly passed to the military commanders, it is he who in the final analysis should interpret overall U.S. policy.

In Léopoldville we did not have active military commands nor do we recall any serious differences between the Embassy and the military representatives.

Where such difficulties may have occurred elsewhere it may be that they have arisen not so much from a conflict of authority between military and civil jurisdictions as from failure of Washington to declare early and clearly just what the lines of authority are.

In the case of military representatives, other than field commanders, e.g., members of military assistance groups, attachés, etc., these, it would appear, are clearly under the direction of the ambassador. They do indubitably have their own channels of communication. In the writer's experience the most successful team operations are those in which all but certain sensitive messages (such as perhaps those on personnel matters) are available to the ambassador or discussed with him or his representative before dispatch. In our experience a reciprocal policy of "openness" with respect to the ambassador's own messages will be found fruitful.

The chief of mission has at his command two of the principal instruments of American foreign policy today: the informational activities of the USIA and particularly in less-developed countries, the foreign economic assistance program. He obviously cannot immerse himself in all the details of these farflung activities and he should refrain from blanketing the initiatives of his public affairs officer and his AID chief. He should, however, know as much about their programs as possible, and he should orchestrate them as best he can. He should be prepared to contribute his presence at staff meetings, on the speaking platform, and in public appearances, and should participate in framing and defending their future programs at home and abroad.

If AID did not exist the logic of the U.S. position in the world would demand that we invent it.

The United States is a very respectable military power and its intelligence services are not puny. But if we are to work to preserve the kind of world in which American values can thrive, we are unlikely to set about it by either military intimidation or the subversion of somebody's citadel.

The powerful lever we have in our hands is American wealth; the example of free enterprise and wise public administration which created it; and the way our people have shared out that wealth which socialist states have yet to match.

The economic aid program is, of course, a hard one to explain to the American taxpayer. Yet it derives its main support from that combination of American altruism and American self-interest which has won so many victories in the past.

From the days of the Puritans and John Smith, Americans have understood that great extremes of wealth and poverty are not only un-Christian but dangerous.

Today, while the planet shrinks, discrepancies in man's fate increase. The United States cannot do the whole job nor anything near it. But in the interests of self-preservation, we should stimulate and join in efforts to reverse a process which can only profit the international political quacks and profiteers of doom.

It is no accident but largely the result of American assistance that no newly independent state in Asia or Africa has yet chosen communism. American economic aid, despite the occasional babble, has had a lot to do with it. Our adversary knows it, and pays us the dubious compliment of copying our program. In the process he has made some colossal blunders.

The aid program has demanded great patience from the American taxpayer. Its successes are not so clear cut and apt for news releases as its costs. Yet, they include the monumental achievement of European recovery. It has made possible the entry into the aid field of those nations which we ourselves started on the path of rehabilitation.

More than 80 percent of foreign aid funds find their way into the U.S. economy since they are committed for U.S. goods and services. The whole program today runs at six-tenths of a percent of the American gross national product.

At the same time as the program strengthens friendly governments, it promotes eventual markets for U.S. goods abroad.

The American chief of mission in the emergent countries realizes the tremendous importance of these programs to the success of his mission. He should be intimately involved in their planning. Most American representatives would agree that more decentralization of planning and administration is desirable and that a way should be found in the American legislative processes to provide for committing funds beyond a given fiscal year.

There have been debates about the relative emphasis economic aid programs should place upon loans versus grants, "impact" projects versus long-term development, recovery versus development, "scatteration" versus concentration, balance-of-payments and budgetary support versus political criteria. It seems to this observer that no one standard can be equally valid for all times and places and that this fact points up the need for flexibility. It does seem also that the concept of the program as a political tool requires spokesmen who can speak for it with the same authority as those who assert the purely economic, budgetary and "bankable" considerations.

In the field, informational exploitation of the program is almost as important as the aid itself. The ordinary citizen of the country being aided is often surprisingly unaware of U.S. help. For example, the device of counterpart funds is very necessary, but the housewife who buys an American aid chicken knows only that she pays for it. Unless the matter is made clearer to her, she has no idea how her purchase may be helping the economy of her own country.

Some predecessor administrations of AID formerly included their own informational staffs in the field. This observer inclines to think this would still be a good idea but failing its adoption, USIS has no

more important responsibility than the explanation and support abroad of U.S. economic aid programs.

Few innovations have so enhanced the U.S. image abroad so unexpectedly as the Peace Corps. Like the aid program, this campaign has succeeded because it taps the wellsprings of American altruism. It also displays one of our most attractive commodities: American youth. Here again many nations, this time the free nations, have watched our success and have begun to copy our methods.

The Peace Corps has not only had its successes abroad but its success at home is good for the American Nation. It has set to vibrating once more the chords of American idealism. It is a successful American youth program as well as a foreign aid program.

Our established American missions abroad are entitled to a share of credit in getting the Peace Corps established. This has required imagination and patience. Hopefully, the Foreign Service will get its own back when the young people in the Peace Corps make choices of a permanent career. They should do well in the Foreign Service.

The USIA program is so formidably prepared and deployed in so many fields: e.g., library, leadership grants, films, publications, radio, student activities, seminars, cultural presentations, etc., that it is bound to make an impression through sheer weight and pervasiveness. But much of this activity will be beside the point or out of key if the chief of mission and USIA yield to the temptation of lifting most of their material from the whizzing transmission belt which runs from USIA Washington.

It may be that the differences between a good information effort and an indifferent one is the degree to which the program is allusive to local conditions, produced on the spot, timely, and geared to day-to-day advocacy of U.S. interests.

The best way to improve the USIA program is to decentralize and to produce as much of it as possible locally. This will be especially fruitful in the developing countries whose personality and character are not fixed but emergent. If USIA is to be effective in the great propaganda competition (call it "cold war" if we must) it is all the more necessary that it be quick on its feet and able to lead as well as counterpunch.

The Ambassador is personally engaged in "public affairs" as much as any member of his staff. He may be a gregarious type to whom people-to-people diplomacy comes naturally, or he may be a sharpshooter more effective on certain target groups and individuals. A tragicomedy of errors can result, however, if he chooses one line in situations where he should be playing the other. He must know his audience as well as his own limitations.

Ideally, the chief of mission should be the man who is able to sum up in a seminal phrase, speech, instruction, or dispatch the position and purpose of the United States. If he can do this he will not only infuse the USIA program with vitality but can polarize the whole U.S. effort in a given country. If, instead of too exclusive reliance on ghost-writers or his capable services, he can himself articulate policy, he can preserve the entire apparatus from cross-purposes and wasted effort. The trick, as in any executive post, is to do enough without trying to do too much.

#### IV. THE CHIEF OF MISSION AND THE POLICY PROCESS

Only in Washington can U.S. foreign policy be definitely established and declared. The President, the Secretary of State, and the representatives of other departments, are in the best position to evaluate competing claims for U.S. attention and to assess priorities and to relate ends to means. The influence of our budgeting process, probably more cumbersome and restrictive with respect to foreign policy than in any other country, is also exerted in Washington.

Despite these obvious facts and despite the foreshortening of the diplomatist's world through modern transport and communications, the margins within which he plies his trade are still wide and the chief of any mission can still make or break the mission. No amount of instructions and visits from the Department can replace the exercise by an American representative abroad of independent judgment under field conditions. If anything, his policy responsibilities are wider than they were before the United States accepted the burden of world leadership a score or so years ago, and they are discharged under very unstandardized conditions in the new countries and in the so-called satellite zone.

There may still exist in the Foreign Service some missions which we used to call "pianola" posts, because like player pianos they run themselves while the man at the keyboard looks appreciative. This writer has never seen such a post.

Although only Washington can make final determinations of policy with all our concerns within its purview, nevertheless it is up to the chief of mission to say clearly to Washington what he thinks is required in his area, and what he thinks will work. The policy responsibilities of the Ambassador are bound to include forward planning and forecasting. Indeed, whenever the mission attempts to analyze where it has been or where it may be going, it is difficult to avoid the crystal ball. To some extent, such exercises will be required by the Department of State, but they should more often be initiated by the mission in the field.

In a cohesive country team operation the projection of military or economic assistance, or of public affairs operations, will necessarily involve cooperative planning.

In the newer countries the mission will have to be especially agile. The situation is characteristically fluid and may require action before Washington can give it full consideration. Most chiefs of mission do recognize the increasing need for latitude in their decisions. The subcommittee has suggested one useful guideline, which is that the chief of mission might be entrusted with decisions on the level of those which an Assistant Secretary of State would have to take in Washington.

In many of the turbulent developing countries, the Department's representatives can well take a leaf from the Navy's book in its practice of what it calls "Unodir": which means that "\* \* \* unless otherwise directed, I propose to do \* \* \*" such-and-such.

One peculiarity which characterizes the work of the diplomatist in developing countries is the fact that U.S. policy with respect to them must still be heavily influenced by consideration for the former colo-



nial powers with whom, in alliance, we share responsibility for defense of the free world. Despite the cascade of colonial authority in the last two decades, our allies have deep sentimental, financial, and military ties with their former colonies. Not infrequently their view of what should be done in a given country will conflict with local opinion in that country and with our own. Whether they are right or wrong, this situation continues to confront Washington policymakers with a series of dilemmas. In the Department of State, policy is often thrashed out in a logrolling contest between the "European desks" and the new offices dealing with the new countries. This is understandable, but it is unfortunately true that policy may sometimes be subject to a kind of immobilism or an imprecision in definition caused by these conflicts of views.

If this triangular situation leads to deadlock, the chief of mission may carry policy along by persisting in his view, or he may at least help to precipitate decision.

The booming economic recovery of our allies has coincided with the increasing disinclination of the American Congress to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of free world defense and economic development. U.S. balance-of-payments difficulties are widely attributed to foreign aid expenses.

The U.S. Government is paying heed to the flood of advice it is receiving to encourage its allies to do more in the underdeveloped areas. There is a tendency to look to the former colonial powers to call forth their special knowledge of their former territories, and to accept increased or primary responsibility for policy decisions and external assistance. An effort is made to ordain priorities by making distinctions between those territories which have frontiers contiguous with the Sino-Soviet bloc and those which do not.

One cannot quarrel with the motives of this approach. It will, however, occur to a number of U.S. representatives in new countries to prefer a case-by-case method to blanket doctrinal application and to test each case for practicability.

In a number of localities the former colonial power cannot bear the burden, or as much of it as we would like. In some places the former colonial power can step up its efforts without reopening old sores. In some places, it cannot. In every case we should consider the effect on the U.S. political and economic position in the country, now and in the future.

It seems unnecessary, therefore, for the United States to go all one way or another; either to go it alone or to pass the play entirely to our allies. It ought rather to play the hand, card by card, in loyal co-operation with our allies and consistently with our sympathy with the aspirations of formerly dependent peoples.

Nor should we be too sure that the countries bordering the Communist empire are in the greatest danger of attack. Communist subversion seems every 5 years or so to find new forms heretofore unfamiliar to us and hence not quickly recognized. At any rate it has shown that it is able to leapfrog boundaries and start a focus of infection far behind where the front lines are assumed to be.

In a few of the developing countries, the American diplomatist will find himself dealing with a fourth entity in addition to Washington, the host government, and the former colonial power. This fourth estate is the United Nations in those countries where it maintains

forces or an extensive civil affairs program. This is a highly specialized situation beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that work with regional organizations and international organizations, especially as they are represented in underdeveloped areas, is an extra dimension for U.S. diplomacy.

In the Congo, the U.S. mission has assisted at a laboratory development of an international force under U.N. mandate. Because it was on the spot and could measure the needs with the means, the mission's recommendations were important to U.S. support of the U.N., despite the clamor of questions which were raised. Through it, also, U.S. views on U.N. activities could be brought to bear directly in the field as well as at U.N. Headquarters at New York. It also saw and urged the need for a prolongation of a U.N. presence after the original terminal date of December 31, 1963.

Fairly frequent visits by an American Ambassador to Washington for consultation are bound to be beneficial. If at all possible, he should take part in discussions with the President and the Secretary of State, NSC and Cabinet-level consultations, and top meetings with Pentagon, AID, and USIA officials. His consultation with committees of Congress and key Senators and Congressmen are also useful, provided it is understood that the Secretary and his principal lieutenants remain the responsible spokesmen before the Congress.

Visits to the field from Washington are, of course, also helpful but very easily overdone in view of the lesser facilities available at some posts. The country desk, or the appropriate Assistant Secretary, should provide a clearinghouse for proposed visits to insure that they are timely and do not overlap or duplicate each other.

#### V. THE CHIEF OF MISSION AND THE SERVICE

We have talked, so far, of the chief of mission as if he were alone on the bridge. He does occasionally know the loneliness of command, but he could achieve little without the support of his interdepartmental crew and the Foreign Service nucleus. If he has emerged from the ranks of the Foreign Service, he will have acquired along the way an almost organic connection with it. If he is a political appointee, he will depend upon it for support in a new endeavor.

When he arrives at his new post, the chief may be surprised to find how diversified an apparatus is at his command. Behind the signature of Ambassador X at the foot of telegrams to "Secstate" stand the counterparts of most of those who backstop the signature of "Rusk" on messages to "Am Embassy."

It will soon occur to the Ambassador to wonder whether this team is as large, larger, or as small as it should be.

No one can deny that Parkinson's law operates in American offices abroad as well as at home. The size and obtrusiveness of American representation sometimes constitute an irritant in our foreign relations little recognized by the American public. There are places in which the American mission is as large as the Foreign Office of the host country.

The nucleus of the organization is still the chancery, including the Ambassador's office and relatively small political, economic, and administrative staffs. By far the larger part of the typical embassy

is composed of attached economic and military aid missions, USIA, the staff of attachés, and various other groups.

The effect of these numbers is not uniform nor necessarily bad. A large embassy is more easily assimilated in capitals where there is a large population of foreigners and a sizable group of migrants and where local living standards do not sharply differ from the Americans. This is not the case in many poverty stricken and lesser developed countries.

The chief of mission is in a position to set himself against the trend to multiply positions under his control. He can at least try to reduce and consolidate staff and rationalize functions. One way to hold the line is to consolidate similar positions such as, for example, that of the Economic Counselor and the chief of the economic mission. Consolidation of administrative services is one obvious possibility. However, chiefs of mission may find the savings from consolidation illusory because the combined administrative organization seems to acquire an organic life of its own and soon begins to inbreed a number of its own new positions.

Although the evils of overstaffing are obvious, one must recognize that there is a limit to possible compression. After all, the size of the mission is really a function of the enormously expanded responsibilities which have been entrusted to our representation abroad. If we could actually do away with economic aid and military assistance, with our appetite for full and immediate reporting, with our rapid-fire communications system, with our requirements for airtight security, and with the obligation to make known the truth about American policies, we could make much deeper cuts. But this in effect means turning the clock back to an easy prewar state of semi-isolation.

Such nostalgic dreams are dangerous. Indeed this writer hesitates even to call attention to the possibility of reduction in force for fear of playing into the hands of those interested not so much in economy as in fleeing from America's obligations as a world power.

We might more profitably look for economies among the range of supporting and housekeeping functions with which the Service is now supplied. But here again we must recognize that the Service is the mirror of the people it represents. In the last 25 years the American people have come to take as their right an abundance of welfare services for which their grandfathers would have found it hard even to find names.

Foreign Service expectations of logistic support have also been influenced by military precedents. We find the most far-reaching supply, maintenance, personnel, and general administrative services in those areas where large American garrisons exist or where they have left behind a tradition of well-manned administration.

Even sturdy Americans abroad, exemplars of economy and self-reliance, will expect to be met on arrival, accommodated in housing found or supplied by the Government, given appropriate allowances, medical care, transportation, schooling for their children, and access to commissaries and recreation facilities. Of course, not all these services will exist everywhere and in some places in Asia and Africa they are necessities, not amenities. And some of them are supplied not by the Government but by cooperative staff efforts. Yet very many younger Americans will expect them as part of the American way of life even abroad. The percentage of young men entering the

Service who are married is doubtless far greater than it used to be 25 years ago. Family status certainly creates a demand in the Service for familiar comforts.

The disadvantage of the excellent administration which can provide such services is not so much the expense as the isolation from the local community which may accidentally result from its efforts.

If the chief of mission is an oldtimer he can recall a day when everybody seemed to get along fairly well without most of the assistance one now receives. But his job is to get the most out of a happy, productive staff and he will therefore try to strike a balance between his own Spartan pretensions and a more modern standard.

The chief of mission must, of course, leave to his deputy chief of mission and administrative officers most detailed and day-to-day responsibilities for budget and fiscal work, general services, some kinds of personnel work, and communications and records. At no time, however, should it be possible to mistake the chief's restraint or the way he budgets his time for lack of interest or attention. Nothing can better preserve morale nor cure ills more readily than visits by him to these operations and an occasional shakedown inspection by him or his deputy chief of mission.

The Foreign Service Inspection Corps has made remarkable contributions to the efficiency and responsiveness of the Service since its establishment on an expanded scale some years ago. It should by no means be limited to the administrative services. Our Inspection Corps differs from most similar groups in the service of other countries in its concern for the substantive work of the mission and how it is being discharged. It is obvious that the ability of the Corps to perform in the substantive field depends upon the selection of superior individuals for this service. Their reports should have high-level distribution and a summary of them should permit those in authority to make a rapid overall estimate of the state of the Service as a whole.

A number of chiefs of mission have suggested the possibility of increased decentralization of authority in the field. This is particularly desirable in the unstandardized conditions in lesser developed countries. It is to be hoped that the Department of State will undertake a survey of the possibilities.

The task of coordinating the various missions and keeping track of assigned projects is one which the Ambassador will share with the deputy chief of mission. No position in the Service is trickier and has fewer guidelines than that of the DCM. The job is not codified, its responsibilities are not precise, and the way it is handled depends so much on relations between the Ambassador and the DCM and the way their personalities mesh. The chief of mission ought to be able to pick his own DCM or to give the departmental personnel people a short slate of nominees.

In the Ambassador/DCM relationship either may gravitate toward executive direction while the other concentrates on writing and planning.

In the typical arrangement, the DCM will serve as chief of staff, exercising overall direction in the Ambassador's name, especially on projects which involve more than one section or agency of the combined mission. Ideally he will be the alter ego of the chief, replacing him without a policy break in his absence, and alternating with him

on trips within the country, so that the mission can accomplish a wider and indispensable travel program.

The DCM and the chief will have the task of welding a unit out of the diverse missions in the embassy and the different kinds of people who compose them. In very recent years, these relationships seem to have shaken down better than in the postwar period, during the acute phase of successive reforms aimed at wider integration of the separate services. The Foreign Service has finally acquired a better understanding of the contribution of military and economic aid and of the uses of the informational machinery of USIS. At the same time, the career principle is being more widely installed in the newer services. In the less developed countries, the rapport between agencies ought to be all the closer, since it is easier for all involved to perceive the common problem and to measure the impact of team operations. This awareness ought to surmount such petty administrative problems as differences in allowances, housing, and position on the diplomatic list. Haggling can perhaps never be ended altogether, but encouraging progress has been made.

This observer is not one who believes that all civilian services abroad can or ought to be completely amalgamated, homogenized and run as one. There is bound to be a permanent core of diplomatists, recruited at the bottom, bred to Service disciplines, available for service anywhere, subject to selection-out procedures, and, in the main, composed of generalists rather than specialists. There is also bound to exist, as long as the United States continues aid abroad of the present type, several groups of specialists of shorter tenure, recruited for specific jobs, and assigned levels commensurate with their age and experience.

The Foreign Service ought to take very liberal views of such things as interchange and transfer between services, shared regulations, and analogous treatment, lateral entry into the Service, and the assignment of temporary personnel to key posts in missions abroad.

Most Foreign Service officers would now agree that the Wriston reforms (named after a vigorous educator and friend of the Service) were beneficial, especially in making talents in the Department and the Foreign Service interchangeable and available to a single career. The program seems, however, to have been less realistic in the scope of the merger it contemplated, and in the speed at which it proposed to move. The departmental and Foreign Service combination, limited as it has had to be, has yielded good results. However, the attempt in the field service, to bring into the Foreign Service Officer Corps, at ranks commensurate with length of service and pay scales, various administrative specialists (e.g., some communications personnel, garage superintendents, etc.) has not been invariably successful and has had to a certain extent to be undone.

The Foreign Service seems entitled to some assurances that it will continue to exist as a career service (just as the armed services exist) and will not be submerged and transformed into some foreign extension of the domestic civil service. Perhaps it needs a breather from continuous reorganizations, for a short time anyway.

One prime justification for the career Foreign Service is its ability to supply men of all ranks for service in the more rugged and undeveloped areas who are actually better than they need to be to hold down

the jobs and who have reserves of character and know-how to call upon in emergencies. It is not too difficult, for example, to recruit (by "job sheet") a specialist—who knows Arabs and oil for a petroleum job in the Middle East. But he may or may not have the background, or the command experience, or the desire, to handle an insurrection or a crisis which calls for more than specialized knowledge. In theory, the Foreign Service exists to be able to supply this kind of need on an interchangeable, ready availability basis.

In the experience of this observer the Foreign Service is doing this kind of job today in the less developed areas, doing it well, and preparing to do it even better by improving the preparation of its members.

While there is not room here for an exhaustive evaluation of the Service some observations in closing can be offered, particularly about the younger officers in the new countries.

In recent years the examination for the Foreign Service has been wisely broadened by including options covering a wider range of background. Whether it is as difficult as the examination of 25 years ago is questionable. It does seem, at least to one observer, to provide a less stern test of organizing and writing ability.

A lot of personal canvassing seems to go into recruitment nowadays. Maybe this is necessary but one wonders what kind of people the Service would get if it would simply work up the most difficult examination it could contrive (in keeping, however, with American standards of higher education), so proclaim it, and then challenge anyone, who thought he was good enough, to take it.

The average young officer seems much better prepared, at least for his particular assignment, than were today's chiefs of mission when they entered the Service. He seems somewhat quieter, just as courageous but less adventurous, and more uxorious. Curiously, in the view of the oldtimers, he seems hell-bent on specialization. The oldtimer was likely to look on the Service as some kind of last refuge of the Renaissance Man (or perhaps it was only for the dilettante). At any rate specialization was "not done," the Department had a hard time selling it, and it was left to the officer to discover for himself, many years later, just how little he knew about so much.

The younger officer today wants something he can get his teeth into and quickly become an authority on.

Fortunately, this leads many of the very best into the undeveloped areas with the sound instinct for being a big frog in a more negotiable pond and of finding adventure while young enough to enjoy it. Some of their colleagues who hit the Paris-Rome-London circuit too soon may be missing some of the indispensable stretching process.

The undeveloped areas provide a number of consulates of the rarer, political outpost variety. These should be considered wonderful assignments for the young officer and we have some wonderful officers in them who are not eager to trade their exposed position for a chancery desk and pallor. The chief of mission in such countries should set up a jealously guarded rotation program for younger officers within the embassy and among the consulates.

Hopefully, more and more young officers will select economics for their specialty. They are told—and one hopes it is true—that it is easier to make a political officer out of an economist than to do the reverse.

Within the period of service of most contemporary chiefs of mission, the inservice training of officers has improved beyond all recognition and interdepartmental cooperation has achieved splendid new departures.

The United States of America faces many decades of peril and challenge in foreign affairs. Despite chronic budgetary colic and spasms and relapses into the cruder forms of isolationism, we show signs of at last accepting the fact and preparing for the long pull.

From administration to administration and from generation to generation the continuity of American foreign relations will be in the hands of the American Foreign Service.

The contributors to this symposium have probed and thumped for the health of this Service. I for one believe, and I think my colleagues would agree, that no country in the world is better served by its diplomats and consuls than the United States of America today.

